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BOOK REVIEWS 
Against Equality of Opportunity. By MATT CAVANAGH. [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 2002. viii, 218, (Bibliography) 2 and (Index) 3 pp. Paperback 
£12.00. ISBN 0-19-926548-8.] 
THIS book is an ambitious and provocative challenge to meritocracy and 
equality, two foundations of equality theory. In questioning and opposing 
the prevailing account of what constitutes appropriate employment 
opportunity, Matt Cavanagh provides a refreshing, and at times 
disquieting, critique of broader anti-discrimination jurisprudence. His 
assessment is worth reading, even when it occasions a clenched jaw. 
A lengthy introduction sets forth the monograph's central question as 
defining what is meant generally by the term "equality of opportunity", 
and specifically "what would be the fair way for jobs to be allocated" 
(p. 5). It then provides an exegesis of the arguments presented in the 
book's three parts. Cavanagh concludes that neither meritocracy nor 
equality is a defensible concept, whereas certain forms of discrimination 
are justifiable. 
Part one ("Meritocracy") defines meritocracy as the widely held 
notion that when filling a job opening an employer ought to engage the 
most qualified individual. Cavanagh opposes this premise by arguing that 
the notion of meritocracy has a greater interest in efficiency than in 
fairness. Because expediency cannot justify overriding an employer's 
property or autonomy rights, merit alone does not provide a sufficient 
reason for abrogating an employer's hiring decision. He further avers that 
those who believe meritocracy is based in fairness do so for two incorrect 
reasons. Holding to an erroneous expectation that the labour market 
normally operates on meritorious grounds leads both to a sense of 
disappointment when a particular candidate is not hired, as well as to a 
false conclusion that something unfair has occurred. Furthermore, 
although meritocracy does entail non-discrimination by preventing 
employers from overtly discriminating on the basis of race or sex, non-
discrimination does not entail meritocracy. Accordingly, Cavanagh rejects 
the accepted wisdom that employers ought to be compelled to hire the 
most qualified person. 
Turning from meritocracy, Part two ("Equality") engages the concept of 
equality as a valid justification for equal workplace opportunity. Cavanagh 
catagorises the more salient theories offered by egalitarians, most notably 
G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel, into three ideals, each 
of which he rejects. The first theory posits that all individuals in a 
community are equal shareholders in a common enterprise. Such a notion 
might hold true in the public arena, for instance as applied to the 
franchise, but does not translate to the private labour market, where from 
a practical standpoint it is impossible to provide everyone with an equally 
decent job. This disjuncture between public and private spheres, Cavanagh 
maintains, compels egalitarians to shift gears and argue in favour of one or 
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both of the other two theories. Providing people with either equal 
assistance or an equal chance to succeed in life, however, merely gives 
those same individuals the means by which to advance themselves and 
thereby become relatively unequal in an opposite sense. Although he is not 
disinclined towards a more limited version of equality, one that would 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and sex, Cavanagh is very 
much against an idea of equality that wholly equates non-discrimination 
with equality of opportunity. 
In Part three ("Discrimination"), Cavanagh elaborates on the 
contextual propriety of discrimination, setting out a theory as to what 
types of discrimination are justifiable. Discrimination is morally wrong 
when it involves treating individuals with unwarranted contempt. By 
contrast, he avers that discrimination lacking malice is morally correct. 
Thus, an employer who genuinely believes that blacks are less capable 
employees than whites, or who "just doesn't like them", or who feels 
"uncomfortable" around them is, according to Cavanagh, expressing a 
non-judgmental preference that ought not to be interfered with ( p. 176). 
Ethically speaking, such a predilection is of a level to gentlemen preferring 
blondes to brunettes. Similarly, he maintains that employment policies and 
practices with discriminatory effects are justifiable so long as their initial 
goal was not to treat the adversely effected individuals as moral inferiors. 
Thus, an employment screening procedure that unintentionally excludes 
blacks or women would, under Cavanagh's theory, be licit and should be 
shielded from external intervention. 
The brief concluding section ("Conclusions") does not recapitulate the 
previous arguments, but instead represents that the world, and the 
philosophical view of the world, is complex, and not always consistent or 
univocal. Cavanagh ends by explaining that his intended audience is "those 
private intellectuals, if there are any left out there" (p. 217). 
Against Equality of Opportunity raises some worthy points in the first 
two Parts, especially about the imprecision frequently applied to the 
definition of equality and to its normative aspirations. As such, that 
portion of the monograph is a welcome reminder that an ecumenical 
understanding of equality of opportunity ought not to be taken for 
granted. Part three, however, is deeply flawed. Unlike the earlier sections 
which engage existing scholarship, Cavanagh ignores wholesale an entire 
corpus of equality literature on the different type of stigma and 
subordination that attaches to members of protected groups, such as black 
and women, as opposed to brunettes, or other unprotected individuals. 
Similarly, he seems unaware of studies on the manner in which some 
proxies used for statistical discrimination, rather than reporting neutral and 
empirically accurate facts, reinstantiate social prejudice because of the 
assumptions that underlie their findings. Moreover, he entirely side-steps 
the question of why a worksite that an individual employer did not 
establish himself, but which nonetheless precludes the participation of 
women or people with disabilities because of its design (in not having 
appropriate toilets or changing facilities), or excludes the employment of 
blacks by maintaining a pre-existing racially restrictive environment (either 
by acceding to customer preferences or through reliance on word-of-mouth 
hiring practices) does not treat those individuals as moral inferiors and 
with unwarranted contempt. Cavanagh would be well within his rights to 
disagree with all of these contentions, but at the very least they should 
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have been acknowledged. The book, and its audience, are the lesser for the 
privation. 
M.A. STEIN 
